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Abstract  
We revisit the relationship between cognitive skills and wage inequality 
using data from the Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC). We argue that previous 
research suffered from a number of methodological shortcomings, and we 
offer a single and unified analytical framework for assessing the contribution of 
skills (including demand and supply conditions) and labour market institutions 
to wage inequality. Contrary to most previous research, we find that skills are at 
least as important as labour market institutions in explaining higher wage 
inequality in the United States.   
 
1. Introduction 
Earnings inequality in the United States has been rising fast and is now the highest in the OECD area. 
Workers at the 90th percentile (P90) earn 5.1 times as much as those at the 10th percentile (P10). This ratio 
is up from 3.7 in 1975, and compares to just 2.3 in Sweden and 3.4 across the OECD on average.1  
This high and rising inequality has generated a growing interest among policy makers and researchers alike 
in its causes and possible remedies. This has been further spurred by an increasing understanding of, and 
consensus about, the significant costs brought by high inequality. These include, among others: reduced 
social mobility (Krueger, 2012), lower social cohesion and trust (Stiglitz, 2012), and a range of health and 
social problems (Pickett and Wilkinson, 2011), including higher crime (Brush, 2007; Choe, 2008).  
In addition, and despite earlier arguments that inequality was a necessary evil in the pursuit of economic 
growth (Kaldor, 1957, Kuznets, 1955, Mirrlees, 1971; Lazear and Rosen, 1981) – economists and 
international organisations are now increasingly in agreement that inequality may be detrimental to growth 
(Clarke, 1992; Ncube, Anyanwu and Hausken, 2013; Ostry, Berg and Tsangarides, 2014; Cingano, 2014). 
Their reasoning ranges from the relatively cautious argument that inequality hurts growth because it leads 
to redistributive pressures (Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Alesina and Rodrik, 2014) to claims that 
inequality is damaging to growth because it: generates social conflict (Benhabib and Rustichini, 1996; 
Perotti, 1996); prevents the talented poor from undertaking profitable investments in physical and human 
capital (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Banerjee and Newman, 1993); or even catalyses financial crises (Rajan, 
2010).  
The causes of rising inequality are also increasingly understood, particularly in the United States where a 
rich literature has flourished on the subject. One strand of this literature focuses on labour market 
institutions, policies and practices as the primary explanations for inequality. The fall in the real value of 
                                                          
*
 This work should not be reported as representing the official views of the OECD or of its member countries. The 
opinions expressed and remaining errors are exclusively those of the authors. 
2 
 
the minimum wage is a widely cited cause (DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux, 1996; DiNardo and Lemieux, 
1997; Lee, 1999; Autor, Manning and Smith 2014), as is the decline in union power (Blau and Kahn, 1996; 
Fortin and Lemieux, 1997; Card, 2001; Card, Lemieux and Riddell, 2004; DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux, 
1996; Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux, 2011; Western and Rosenfeld, 2011). Lemieux, McLeod and Parent 
(2007) have also identified performance pay as an important source of wage inequality.  
Another, and almost unrelated, strand of the literature has focused on the role of skills in explaining rising 
wage inequality in the United States. A commonly advanced argument is that technological change is skill-
biased, thereby leading to an increase in demand for skilled workers. Given that the supply of educated 
workers has not kept pace with this rise in demand, the returns to skill (and therefore inequality) have 
risen (Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1993; Juhn, 1999; Goldin and Katz, 2008; Autor, 2014). At the same 
time, the number of job opportunities for middle-skilled workers has shrunk as routine tasks have 
become increasingly automated (Autor, Levy and Murnane, 2003; Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2006) or 
offshored to countries with lower wages and other costs (Blinder, 2009). This polarisation of employment 
growth in the United States has resulted in wage polarisation, exacerbating the trend in wage inequality 
(Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux, 2011; Autor and Dorn, 2013; Boehm, 2014).  
However, while it is now widely accepted that changes in the supply of, and demand for, skills have 
contributed to rising wage inequality in the United States, another strand of research remains inconclusive 
about the role of skills in explaining differences in the level of wage inequality between the United States 
and other countries. Blau and Kahn (1996) used a demand and supply model in the spirit of Katz and 
Murphy (1992) to analyse the extent to which higher wage inequality in the United States could be 
explained by differences in the relative supply of, and demand for, educated workers. Their results 
suggested that market forces appeared to have very little explanatory power, from which they concluded 
that institutions must be the main driver of international differences in wage inequality.  
Leuven, Oosterbeek and van Ophem (2004), however, showed that Blau and Kahn’s (1996) results were 
driven by the use of years of schooling and work experience as proxies for skill. Using the more direct 
measures of cognitive skills contained in the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS), they found that 
about a third of the variation in relative wages between skill groups across countries could be explained 
by differences in the net supply of skill. They also concluded that the demand and supply framework did 
an even better job at explaining relative wages of low-skilled workers: nearly 60% of the variation in the 
skill wage differential between the lower and middle thirds of the skill distribution could be explained by 
relative net supply, and 44% of the variation between the lower and upper thirds of the skill distribution.  
In their response to Leuven, Oosterbeek and Van Ophem (2004), Blau and Kahn (2005) also used the 
IALS data, but applied the Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) decomposition method instead to analyse the 
shares of international differences in wage inequality that could be attributed to skill endowments, prices 
and a residual, respectively. Using this approach, Blau and Kahn (2005) insisted that their previous 
conclusions remained essentially unchanged, i.e. that higher labour market prices played a quantitatively 
more important role in explaining higher wage inequality in the United States than differences in the 
distribution of cognitive skills.2  More recent research (Jovicic, 2015; Paccagnella, 2015; Pena, 2015) using 
data from the Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) and decomposition methods identical (or similar) to Blau 
and Kahn (2005), reaches essentially the same conclusions.  
However, Leuven, Oosterbeek and van Ophem (2004) were right to point out that such decomposition 
exercises are essentially static in nature and ignore the fact that the price of skill itself is determined by the 
relative supply of, and demand for, skill. In other words: differences in skills prices cannot simply be 
interpreted as reflecting differences in institutional set-ups. They will, to some extent, also reflect the 
relative scarcity of skills.  
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In this paper, we throw a fresh look at the extent to which higher wage inequality in the United States can 
be blamed on skills, and we make a number of important contributions to the literature. First, we bring a 
much improved dataset to the debate, including greater country coverage and better information on 
wages.3 Second, we draw on recent methodological advances and use simulation techniques in the spirit 
of DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) and Lemieux (2002, 2010) to build counterfactual wage 
distributions to analyse the contribution of skills (and how they are rewarded) to international differences 
in wage inequality.4 Third, we extend these simulations to take account for demand and supply conditions 
(similar to the method used by DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux, 1996). Fourth, we propose a new method 
for analysing the role of skill inequality in explaining wage inequality. And, finally, our approach also 
allows us to simulate the effect of different labour market institutions on wage inequality, thereby 
bridging the two separate literatures discussed above (i.e. the “institutional” and the “market force” 
strands of the inequality literature).5 In fact, the greatest contribution of our paper is that it offers a single 
and unified analytical framework for assessing the importance of skills (including demand and supply 
conditions) and labour market institutions to international differences in wage inequality.6  
Our results suggest that higher skills inequality in the United States accounts for 15% of the difference in 
wage inequality with other countries (as measured by the Gini index), while differences in the demand for 
and supply of skills can explain just over a quarter. In comparison, higher minimum wages in other 
countries account for only 7% of the difference in wage inequality with the United States, and higher 
union coverage for two fifths.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we describe the data we use and provide 
some descriptive statistics. Section 3 analyses the extent to which higher wage inequality in the United 
States can be attributed to skills and skills prices, while Sections 4, 5 and 6 discuss the contributions of 
skill inequality, demand and supply factors, and institutions, respectively. Section 7 offers some 
concluding remarks.  
2. Data and descriptive statistics 
Leuven, Oosterbeek and van Ophem (2004) demonstrated the importance of using direct measures 
(rather than proxies) of skill to analyse the relationship between skill and wage inequality.7 The OECD’s 
adult literacy surveys, which assessed the skills of adults in a comparable manner across a number of 
countries, are therefore an ideal source of information to carry out such analyses. The first of these 
surveys, the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS), was carried out in the 1990s in a total of 23 
countries/regions around the world. This was the data used by Devroye and Freeman (2001), Leuven, 
Oosterbeek and van Ophem (2004) and Blau and Kahn (2005) – although they were only able to use a 
subset of these countries (see below). Between 2003 and 2008, the OECD ran the Adult Literacy and 
Lifeskills (ALL) Survey in a total of 10 countries. As far as we are aware, this survey was never used to 
analyse the relationship between skills and wage inequality. The latest of the OECD surveys (and the one 
we use in this paper) is the Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC), the first round of which covered 24 
countries/regions over the period 2008-2013.8  
PIAAC directly assessed the proficiency of around 166 000 adults (aged 16-65) from 24 countries in 
literacy, numeracy and problem solving in technology-rich environments. In addition, the survey gathered 
data on individuals’ labour market status, contract type, wages, bonuses, education, work experience, and 
a range of demographic characteristics. The achieved samples range from around 4 500 in Sweden to 
nearly 27 300 in Canada.  
In this paper, we use data for the 22 OECD countries/regions covered by PIAAC (i.e. leaving out Cyprus 
and the Russian Federation). Our dataset presents a number of advantages over the IALS samples used 
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by the aforementioned studies, particularly in terms of country coverage and the quality of wage 
information. Devroye and Freeman (2001) focus on just four countries (the United States, Sweden, 
Germany and the Netherlands) because “good measures of earnings for individuals” were available only 
for those countries. In addition, the data they use for Germany and the Netherlands were only available in 
20 unevenly-represented categories – a problem which the authors tried to circumvent by generating a 
random component to the earnings of workers in those countries. Leuven, Oosterbeek and van Ophem 
(2004) manage to include 15 of the IALS countries, but for three of them wages were reported in 
intervals. Finally, Blau and Kahn (2005) focus on the nine advanced IALS countries only (excluding 
Germany), but earnings for two of their countries were top-coded. In contrast to these studies, our 
dataset includes 22 OECD countries, each with continuous wage and skills measures.  
Table 1 shows mean wages and skills for the 22 OECD countries included in our sample, as well as of 
their level of dispersion. Our measure of gross hourly wages includes bonuses and is expressed in 
purchasing power parity corrected USD. As our measure of skills, we use individuals’ continuous score in 
numeracy, measured on a 500-point scale.9 Both wage and skill dispersion are measured using the ratios 
of: the 90th to the 10th percentiles (P90/P10), the 90th to the 50th percentiles (P90/P50), the 50th to the 
10th percentiles, as well as by the Gini index.  
Table 1: Summary statistics: Levels and dispersion of skills and wages 
   
Skill 
 
Hourly wage 
  N 
 
Mean P90/P10 P90/P50 P50/P10 Gini 
 
Mean P90/P10 P90/P50 P50/P10 Gini 
Australia 4371 
 
276 1.60 1.21 1.32 0.104 
 
18.9 3.14 1.90 1.65 0.250 
Austria 2943 
 
279 1.54 1.19 1.29 0.095 
 
19.1 3.05 1.83 1.67 0.250 
Canada 16116 
 
271 1.66 1.22 1.35 0.109 
 
20.4 3.94 1.94 2.03 0.280 
Czech Republic 2630 
 
279 1.49 1.18 1.26 0.087 
 
9.0 2.88 1.68 1.71 0.240 
Denmark 4448 
 
286 1.52 1.19 1.28 0.092 
 
23.8 2.58 1.55 1.66 0.210 
England/N. Ireland (UK) 4801 
 
271 1.63 1.23 1.33 0.107 
 
18.4 3.53 2.07 1.71 0.300 
Estonia 3972 
 
277 1.51 1.19 1.26 0.089 
 
9.6 4.71 2.24 2.10 0.320 
Finland 3251 
 
292 1.51 1.19 1.26 0.091 
 
19.3 2.54 1.70 1.50 0.200 
Flanders (B) 2736 
 
287 1.54 1.19 1.30 0.094 
 
22.2 2.61 1.67 1.56 0.210 
France 3696 
 
261 1.73 1.23 1.40 0.117 
 
15.6 2.56 1.77 1.45 0.220 
Germany 3382 
 
278 1.60 1.20 1.33 0.101 
 
18.8 4.22 1.88 2.25 0.290 
Ireland 2784 
 
265 1.61 1.22 1.32 0.105 
 
21.6 3.57 2.08 1.71 0.290 
Italy 1815 
 
255 1.66 1.22 1.36 0.110 
 
16.1 3.42 1.99 1.72 0.270 
Japan 3262 
 
292 1.46 1.17 1.25 0.083 
 
16.1 4.08 2.32 1.76 0.330 
Korea 3097 
 
268 1.52 1.18 1.29 0.092 
 
17.8 5.83 2.68 2.18 0.390 
Netherlands 3162 
 
287 1.51 1.18 1.28 0.091 
 
21.5 3.24 1.79 1.81 0.250 
Norway 3553 
 
286 1.55 1.19 1.30 0.097 
 
24.3 2.44 1.60 1.52 0.200 
Poland 3908 
 
267 1.59 1.22 1.31 0.101 
 
9.3 3.89 2.15 1.81 0.310 
Slovak Republic 2505 
 
285 1.44 1.17 1.24 0.082 
 
8.9 4.01 2.15 1.87 0.320 
Spain 2456 
 
258 1.61 1.20 1.34 0.103 
 
15.0 3.60 2.05 1.75 0.280 
Sweden 2888 
 
287 1.55 1.19 1.30 0.096 
 
18.7 2.18 1.59 1.37 0.170 
United States 2793 
 
261 1.75 1.24 1.41 0.120 
 
21.5 4.81 2.40 2.01 0.340 
Notes: Data refer to wage and salary earners only. Wages are trimmed, by country, at the top and bottom percentiles.  
The United States has one of the lowest skill levels of the countries included in the sample – only Spain 
and Italy perform worse. The average numeracy score in the United States is more than 30 points (10%) 
lower than in Finland and Japan, the highest performing countries in the PIAAC sample. In addition, the 
United States has the highest level of skills inequality, both at the top and at the bottom of the skills 
distribution. The P90/P10 ratio in the United States is over 50% higher than that observed in the Slovak 
Republic, the country in the sample with the most equal skills distribution.10 Finally, Table 1 shows that 
high skills inequality in the United States goes paired with high wage inequality, which is second to Korea 
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only. Inequality in the United States is particularly high at the top of the wage distribution (P90/P50), 
while bottom-half wage inequality is higher still in Canada, Estonia, Korea and Germany.  
The table also suggests that there may only be a weak cross-country relationship between skills and wage 
inequality. While there are countries, like the United States, where both skill and wage inequality are high 
(e.g. Canada, Germany and Italy), and others where both skill and wage inequality are low (e.g. the 
Scandinavian countries), there are also countries that combine high skill inequality with low wage 
inequality (e.g. France) and some that combine low skill inequality with high wage inequality (e.g. Japan 
and Korea). A slightly stronger (albeit still weak) negative relationship exists between the average level of 
skill and wage inequality: countries with more skilled workforces tend to have lower wage inequality.  
Finally, countries differ not only in terms of the skills of their workforce, but also in how these skills are 
rewarded in the labour market. Figure 1 shows that the return to skill is highest in the United States. In 
fact, the return to skill in the United States is nearly three times greater than in Sweden, the country with 
the lowest returns. Critically for the analysis that follows, the return to skill in the United States is also 
highly non-linear – i.e. rising in skill level (see Figure A.1 in the Annex). Other countries that exhibit 
strongly increasing returns to skill include Slovakia, Canada and the United Kingdom, whereas the returns 
to skill are fairly constant along the skills distribution in countries like Belgium, Sweden and Finland.       
Figure 1: Returns to skill 
 
Notes: The figure shows the coefficient on skill from a regression of log hourly wages (including bonuses) for wage and salary 
earners on standardised numeracy scores.  
  
000
000
000
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000
000
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3. The contribution of skills and skills prices to wage inequality: The standard decomposition 
approach and its limitations 
The standard approach for analysing the contribution of skills to differences in wage inequality across 
countries is to decompose these differences into an endowment (skill) effect and a price effect. The 
particular methodology for doing these decompositions varies: Devroye and Freeman (2001) and Jovicic 
(2015) use a simple variance decomposition; Blau and Kahn (2005) and Pena (2015) apply the Juhn, 
Murphy and Pierce (1993) decomposition, while Paccagnella (2015) resorts to unconditional quantile 
regressions (Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux, 2009).  
In this paper, we use an altogether different methodology, and simulate alternative wage distributions 
using reweighting techniques in the spirit of DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) and Lemieux (2002, 
2010). According to Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo (2011), this reweighting approach should be the preferred 
method for aggregate decompositions, and we favour this approach for two reasons.11 The first is its 
simplicity and transparency which, in our opinion, make it less vulnerable to potential error. The second, 
and perhaps more important, reason is its flexibility. Indeed, as will become clear later on in this paper, 
this methodology not only allows us to analyse the impact of the (full) skills distribution on wage 
inequality, but can also be extended to incorporate demand and supply conditions as well as the impact of 
a number of labour market institutions. The main attraction of this approach therefore lies in the 
possibility that it offers to build a unified methodological framework to analyse and compare the impacts 
of skills, market forces and institutions on wage inequality.  
In this section, the reweighting technique is used to analyse the importance of skill endowments and skill 
prices on wage inequality, in line with the standard approach followed in the literature. For the 
endowment effect, we are interested in knowing what would happen to wage inequality in the United 
States if it had the same skills distribution as a comparator country, x. To model this, we attach more/less 
weight to individuals in the United States whose skills are more/less common in the comparator country. 
This is achieved by replacing the original sample weights i,US for individual i in the United States with 
counterfactual weights ’i,US = i,USS,x, where S,x represents the reweighting factor. In practice, we 
obtain the reweighting factor by first dividing the samples for both countries into S bins of 5 skills points 
each,12 and then computing the ratio of the shares  of total employment in each country in each of these 
skills bins – i.e. 𝑆,𝑥 =
𝜃𝑆,𝑥
𝜃𝑆,𝑈𝑆
. Holding skills prices constant, this reweighting results in an alternative wage 
distribution for the United States. Standard wage dispersion and inequality measures can then be 
computed and compared to those estimated on the original wage distribution, and the difference between 
these wage inequality measures can be attributed to the effect of skills.  
To estimate the price effect, we want to know what would happen to wage inequality in the United States 
if the skills of its workforce were rewarded in the same way as in a comparator country x, holding the 
distribution of skills constant. To model this, we base our approach on Lemieux (2002, 2010) and we 
start, once again, by dividing the samples for the two countries into S bins of 5 skills points each. We then 
estimate the conditional mean of log wages of skill group S in the United States (yS,US) and in the 
comparator country (yS,x), and the difference between these two average wages is added to each 
individual’s original wage to estimate his/her new counterfactual wage y’i,US: 
𝑦𝑖,𝑈𝑆
′ = 𝑦𝑖,𝑈𝑆 + (𝑦𝑆,𝑥 − 𝑦𝑆,𝑈𝑆) 
Figure 2 provides an idea of what these two wage simulations look like in practice and shows the 
reweighted wage distributions for the United States obtained by applying: (i) the Dutch skills distribution 
and (ii) Dutch skills prices. The choice of the Netherlands as comparator country is somewhat arbitrary, 
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but reflects the fact that this is a country that combines high skill levels with low inequality in both skills 
and wages. In panel A, which applies the Dutch skills distribution to the United States, the United States 
wage distribution shifts somewhat to the right, but its height lowers and its dispersion increases (i.e. it 
becomes more unequal – a counterintuitive result to which we shall return below). In panel B, which 
applies the Dutch return to skill, the United States distribution becomes narrower (i.e. less unequal).  
Figure 2: The United States wage distribution before and after applying the Netherlands’ skill 
distribution and prices 
A. US before and after Netherlands skills distribution          B. US before and after Netherlands skills prices 
 
Notes: Epanechnikov kernel density plots (evaluated at 50 points).  
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Table 2 repeats this exercise for all the other countries in the PIAAC data and shows what proportion of 
the difference in wage inequality between the United States and each country can be attributed to 
differences in skills endowments and skills prices, respectively. Consistent with the previous literature, 
differences in the return to skill can explain a much larger proportion of the higher wage inequality in the 
United States than can differences in skill endowments. Approximately one third of the higher P90/P10 
wage ratio is due to higher skills prices in the United States.  
By contrast, in most cases, the P90/P10 wage ratio (and the Gini) would increase (rather than decrease) if 
the United States adopted the skills distribution of the comparator country – a result driven primarily by 
increases in the P50/P10 wage ratio. This counterintuitive result (also obtained by Paccagnella, 2015 and 
Pena, 2015) is the result of: (i) relatively low skills levels in the United States and (ii) significantly higher 
marginal returns to skill in the top half of the distribution (see Figure A.1 in the Annex). Increasing the 
skills of the workforce in the United States would therefore mechanically lead to an increase in wage 
inequality at the bottom of the wage distribution, as the wages of those at the P50 would increase faster 
than those at the P10.13 This result is clearly unrealistic and highlights a first limitation of using 
decomposition methods for analysing the contribution of skills to international differences in wage 
inequality. In reality, of course, one would expect an increase in overall skill levels to lead to a fall in the 
price of skill. Yet the standard decomposition methods, by taking a comparative static approach to what 
is essentially a dynamic phenomenon, are therefore unable to account for differences in net supply and 
demand conditions. This was part of Leuven, Oosterbeek and van Ophem’s (2004) critique of Blau and 
Kahn (2005).  
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Table 2: Proportion (%) of the difference in wage inequality with the United States explained by 
skills endowments and skills prices 
 
Skills endowments 
 
Skill prices 
 P90/P10 P90/P50 P50/P10 Gini 
 
P90/P10 P90/P50 P50/P10 Gini 
Australia -9.5 4.9 -24.8 -0.9 
 
35.0 37.8 26.3 26.1 
Austria -5.6 12.4 -30.8 1.3 
 
25.9 27.3 18.8 20.8 
Canada -19.7 0.7 397.1 -1.3 
 
55.3 33.5 -420.3 33.6 
Czech Republic -1.5 12.9 -31.3 4.1 
 
18.1 22.6 3.7 15.2 
Denmark -11.4 3.9 -39.2 -0.6 
 
30.0 26.7 28.7 20.8 
England/N. Ireland (UK) -10.5 3.5 -22.0 -0.1 
 
18.1 21.3 13.1 19.7 
Estonia -33.8 55.1 97.6 21.7 
 
309.1 68.6 -53.4 64.5 
Finland -18.6 -0.5 -34.0 -0.9 
 
27.5 32.2 15.4 19.1 
Flanders (B) -13.1 2.7 -30.7 -1.2 
 
27.6 29.3 18.5 19.6 
France 2.9 4.2 1.0 1.2 
 
25.7 29.1 17.0 20.1 
Germany -27.9 7.9 44.2 -1.4 
 
63.7 25.1 -21.5 28.4 
Ireland 8.3 16.1 0.4 8.7 
 
30.1 46.2 12.6 28.4 
Italy 14.8 17.5 9.2 12.4 
 
36.3 42.1 24.8 29.1 
Japan -50.7 31.7 -70.0 3.2 
 
43.7 149.8 17.1 77.8 
Korea -13.2 -39.4 22.5 -18.0 
 
-31.0 -43.1 -18.9 -24.2 
Netherlands -17.9 6.2 -74.8 -0.6 
 
34.5 31.4 36.4 26.5 
Norway -12.9 1.1 -28.1 -2.0 
 
25.9 25.7 19.2 18.8 
Poland 7.7 27.2 -13.8 14.1 
 
41.8 53.7 26.6 44.1 
Slovak Republic -11.9 40.4 -91.9 16.5 
 
27.5 38.0 9.7 45.2 
Spain 19.9 26.9 9.5 16.2 
 
24.9 30.3 16.0 17.3 
Sweden -12.4 2.1 -23.9 -1.3  28.0 30.2 18.0 18.9 
Notes: The table shows the proportion of the difference in wage inequality between the United States and country x that can be 
explained by skills and skills prices, respectively. For example, 35.0% of the difference in the P90-P10 wage ratios between the 
United States and Australia can be explained by different returns to skill in Australia. Negative figures indicate that the difference 
between the United States and the comparator country would increase (rather than decrease) if the comparator country’s skills 
distribution or skills prices were adopted.  
In the remainder of this paper, we seek to address these limitations of the standard approach. First, we 
argue that, in the presence of strong skill price effects, a decomposition exercise that looks at skill 
inequality rather than at the full skill distribution results in more sensible estimates of the contribution of 
skills to wage inequality. Second, we explicitly consider demand and supply conditions in assessing the 
importance of skills for wage inequality. Importantly, we are the first to do so within a single and 
coherent methodological framework, using the same reweighting techniques to analyse the effects of skills 
inequality, market forces, as well as institutional arrangements.  
4. Skill inequality and wage inequality 
In this section, we use the reweighting techniques to analyse the impact of skills inequality on wage 
inequality. The approach is similar to the one used above to simulate the impact of skill endowments – 
except that the skill variable is now demeaned to remove level effects (and therefore 
undesired/counterintuitive price effects).   
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Figure 3 illustrates the effect on the United States wage distribution of applying the de-meaned Dutch 
skills distribution (i.e. Dutch skills inequality). The effect is relatively small, but a slight compression of 
the wage distribution can be observed.  
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Figure 3: The United States wage distribution before and after applying Dutch skills inequality 
 Notes: Epanechnikov kernel density plots (evaluated at 50 points).  
Table 3 repeats this exercise for all the other countries in the sample and shows to what extent differences 
in wage inequality in the United States can be attributed to its higher level of skills inequality. The results 
are more in line with what one would expect. For example, if skills inequality in the United States were 
similar to that observed in the Slovak Republic (the country with the most equal skills distribution, as 
measured by the Gini), then the difference in wage inequality between the United States and the Slovak 
Republic would fall by 64% (as measured by the Gini index). Conversely, if skills inequality in the United 
States were similar to that observed in France (the country with the second highest level of skills 
inequality), then the difference in wage inequality between the United States and France would fall by 
1.2% only. On average, higher skills inequality in the United States accounts for 15% of its higher wage 
inequality (as measured by the Gini index). Skills inequality also explains a significantly larger part of 
higher wage inequality in the United States at the top (24%) than at the bottom of the wage distribution 
(4%). As argued later, this is likely to be because wages at the bottom of the distribution are determined 
less by skills and more by labour market institutions.   
Table 3: Proportion (%) of the difference in wage inequality with the United States explained by 
skills inequality  
 
P90/P10 P90/P50 P50/P10 Gini 
Australia 8.3 11.4 2.9 5.5 
Austria 12.2 15.0 5.6 9.5 
Canada 9.1 8.4 -7.3 5.1 
Czech Republic 15.5 18.4 5.3 13.0 
Denmark 9.7 10.9 4.2 6.3 
England/N. Ireland (UK) 7.7 15.3 -0.3 8.7 
Estonia 265.9 75.6 -21.5 54.4 
Finland 9.6 12.7 3.3 6.1 
Flanders (B) 8.9 11.2 3.0 5.8 
France 2.5 4.1 0.4 1.2 
Germany 22.3 12.8 0.1 11.3 
Ireland 12.9 22.5 2.7 11.6 
Italy 9.2 14.7 1.1 7.3 
Japan 40.0 163.7 8.8 75.0 
Korea -28.4 -44.1 -10.6 -24.7 
0
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Netherlands 15.7 16.1 11.3 10.7 
Norway 7.3 9.1 2.6 4.6 
Poland 20.5 30.4 8.4 20.7 
Slovak Republic 40.4 54.8 15.8 64.3 
Spain 19.3 27.2 7.9 13.6 
Sweden 6.7 9.5 1.5 4.1 
Notes: The table shows the proportion of the difference in wage inequality between the United States and country x that can be 
explained by skills inequality. For example, 8.3% of the difference in the P90-P10 wage ratios between the United States and 
Australia can be explained by lower skills inequality in Australia. Negative figures indicate that the difference between the United 
States and the comparator country would increase (rather than decrease) if the comparator country’s skills inequality were 
adopted. This only happens in cases where the comparator country’s skill inequality is higher than in the United States.  
5. Factoring in the demand for and supply of skills 
Leuven, Oosterbeek and van Ophem (2004) argued that one of the weaknesses of the analysis by Blau 
and Kahn (2005) (a weakness that also applies to the most recent papers by Paccagnella, 2015 and Pena, 
2015), is that they fail to account for differences across countries in the relative demand for, and supply 
of, skills. Indeed, the higher price effects found by these authors will, to some extent, reflect differences 
in such market conditions. Leuven, Oosterbeek and van Ophem (2004) address this issue by adapting a 
methodology developed by Katz and Murphy (1992) to relate differences in wages between skill groups to 
changes in the demand for, and supply of, those skills. Their results show that about one third of the 
variation in relative wages between skill groups across countries can be explained by differences in the net 
supply of skill groups. However, because they: (i) use a different methodology; and (ii) look at relative 
wages between skills groups (rather than measures of wage inequality), it is difficult to compare their 
results to what has been obtained elsewhere in the literature. For these reasons, we propose a way of 
incorporating relative demand and supply conditions in the reweighting framework used so far, based on 
a similar exercise performed by DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) for analysing changes in wage 
inequality in the United States over time - but never, to our knowledge, applied in any other context since.  
The basic intuition behind our approach is to see what would happen to wages for skill group S in the 
United States, should the supply and demand conditions for that skill group reflect those prevalent in the 
comparator country x. To implement this in practice, we divide the sample into S skill groups of 10 
points each.14 For each skill group in the United States, we then derive supply and demand indices relative 
to those prevalent for the same skill group in country x. The supply index ∆𝑆𝑆,𝑥
𝑈𝑆 is defined simply as the 
share 𝜀𝑆,𝑈𝑆 of skill group S in the total labour force in the United States, relative to the share 𝜀𝑆,𝑥 occupied 
by that skill group in the comparator country, x: 
∆𝑆𝑆,𝑥
𝑈𝑆 = ln⁡(
𝜀𝑆,𝑈𝑆
𝜀𝑆,𝑥
) (1) 
In building the demand index, ∆𝐷𝑆,𝑥
𝑈𝑆, we follow the approach proposed by Blau and Kahn (1996) and 
Leuven, Oosterbeek and van Ophem (2004) and measure the degree to which the occupation-industry 
structure15 O in the United States favours skill group S in comparison to country x. Specifically:  
∆𝐷𝑆,𝑥
𝑈𝑆 = ln⁡[1 +∑
𝜃𝑆,𝑜,𝑥
𝜀𝑆,𝑥
(𝜃𝑜,𝑈𝑆 − 𝜃𝑜,𝑥)
𝑜
] (2) 
Where 𝜃𝑜,𝑈𝑆 and 𝜃𝑜,𝑥 are the total shares of employment in occupation-industry cell O in the United States 
and country x, respectively; 𝜃𝑆,𝑜,𝑥 is skill group S’s share of employment in occupation-industry cell O in 
the comparator country; and 𝜀𝑆,𝑥 is the share of skill group S in the total workforce of the comparator 
country. In essence, this index captures: (i) the relative importance of occupation O in the United States; 
and (ii) the “average” demand for skill group S in occupation O in the comparator country. Combining 
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these two factors therefore results in a measure of the relative demand for skill group S in the United 
States. 
Figure 4 illustrates what these supply and demand indices look like when the United States is compared to 
the Netherlands. As the figure shows, the United States has a relatively high supply of low-skilled workers 
in comparison to the Netherlands, while the opposite is true for high-skilled workers. The demand index 
shows that the demand for high-skilled workers in the United States is about the same as in the 
Netherlands, while the demand for low-skilled workers is comparatively higher.  
Figure 4: The supply of and demand for skills in the United States versus the Netherlands 
 
Notes: The figure shows, for each level of skill, the difference between in the supply and demand indices between the United 
States and the Netherlands. For example, for the most skilled group of workers (top bars), the supply line is negative (indicating 
that the United States has a lower supply of skilled workers than the Netherlands), while the demand line is marginally positive 
(indicating that the United States has a higher demand for the most skilled workers).  
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Table 4 shows what the demand for, and supply of, skills in the United States look like compared to the 
other countries in the sample. As the negative values in the first column indicate, the demand for low-
skilled workers is lower in the United States than in most other countries – with the exception of the 
Scandinavian countries, Australia, Canada and Belgium, where the demand for low-skilled workers is even 
lower. By contrast, the supply of low-skilled workers in the United States is the highest amongst the 
countries included in the sample, with the exception of Spain. This picture is inverted when looking at 
high-skilled workers, for which there is relatively high demand in the United States, but low supply. Only 
in Canada, the Netherlands and Norway is the demand for high-skilled workers greater. The supply of 
high-skilled workers, however, is higher in 15 out of the 21 other countries. Overall, the differences in the 
supply of skills between the United States and the other countries are much larger than the differences in 
demand.  
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Table 4: The demand for and supply of skills relative to the United States 
 
Low-level skills*  High-level skills* 
 Demand Supply  Demand Supply 
Australia 0.002 0.580  0.055 -0.386 
Austria -0.032 0.932  0.068 -0.404 
Canada 0.058 0.405  -0.034 -0.326 
Czech Republic -0.086 1.273  0.209 -0.266 
Denmark 0.023 1.040  0.016 -0.569 
England/N. Ireland (UK) -0.039 0.303  0.079 -0.194 
Estonia -0.080 1.012  0.107 -0.237 
Finland 0.012 1.247  0.031 -0.701 
Flanders (B) 0.008 0.918  0.025 -0.624 
France -0.044 0.044  0.087 0.068 
Germany -0.044 0.641  0.112 -0.426 
Ireland -0.036 0.370  0.088 0.162 
Italy -0.149 0.057  0.339 0.644 
Japan -0.003 1.680  0.090 -0.675 
Korea -0.133 0.647  0.211 0.368 
Netherlands 0.097 0.928  -0.005 -0.597 
Norway 0.058 0.860  -0.001 -0.623 
Poland -0.084 0.341  0.167 0.041 
Slovak Republic -0.085 0.845  0.074 -0.315 
Spain -0.093 -0.035  0.258 0.796 
Sweden -0.027 0.894  0.023 -0.656 
* Low (high)-level skills are defined as the bottom (top) ten skills intervals (out of a total of 25).  
In the next step, we use these indices to estimate what part of the (log) wage differential ∆?̂?𝑆𝑥
𝑈𝑆 between 
the United States and the comparator country can be attributed to differences in the supply of and 
demand for skill:  
∆?̂?𝑆𝑥
𝑈𝑆 = 𝛽𝑆∆𝑆𝑆𝑥
𝑈𝑆 + 𝛽𝐷∆𝐷𝑆𝑥
𝑈𝑆 (3) 
Where the parameters 𝛽𝑆 and 𝛽𝐷 are estimated by regressing ∆𝑦𝑆𝑥
𝑈𝑆 (the log of the ratio of wages of skill 
group S in the United States over those in country x) on a constant, α, the indices of demand and supply 
for skill group S in the United States relative to those in country x, as well as country fixed effects, 𝜌𝑥: 
∆𝑦𝑆𝑥
𝑈𝑆 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆∆𝑆𝑆𝑥
𝑈𝑆 + 𝛽𝐷∆𝐷𝑆𝑥
𝑈𝑆 + 𝜌𝑥 + 𝜀𝑆𝑥
𝑈𝑆 (4) 
In practice, this regression is run on 21 country x 25 skill group (i.e. 525) observations. As expected, 𝛽𝑆 is 
negative (i.e. an increase in the relative supply of skilled workers in the United States would lead to a fall 
in their wages relative to the comparator country) and 𝛽𝐷 positive (i.e. an increase in the relative demand 
for skilled workers in the United States would increase the wages of skilled workers in the United States 
relative to those in the comparator country).  
In the next and final step, the predicted wage differential (∆?̂?𝑆𝑥
𝑈𝑆) obtained from equation (3) is subtracted 
from the original wage of each individual in skill group S in the United States, to give us the 
counterfactual wage of that individual if demand and supply conditions of the comparator country 
prevailed in the United States.   
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Figure 5 shows that applying the supply and demand conditions of the Netherlands to the United States 
(i.e. increasing the net supply of skill in the United States) would result in a reduction in wage inequality in 
the United States.  
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Figure 5: The United States wage distribution before and after adjusting for Dutch supply and 
demand for skill 
 Notes: Epanechnikov kernel density plots (evaluated at 50 points).  
Table 5 repeats this exercise for every comparator country included in the sample, and summarises the 
extent to which higher wage inequality in the United States can be attributed to different demand and 
supply conditions. Looking at the Gini coefficient, on average 27.8% of the difference in wage inequality 
between the United States and other countries can be explained by differences in the demand for, and 
supply of, skills (20.6% excluding Japan, which is an outlier). Interestingly (and in line with results 
obtained using a different methodology by Broecke, Quintini and Vandeweyer, 2015), the importance of 
market forces appears to be greater at the top of the distribution (where it explains 38.1% of the 
difference in wage inequality with other countries) than at the bottom of the wage distribution (where it 
explains just 0.4% of the difference). In Broecke, Quintini and Vandeweyer (2015), we speculated that 
this might be because the wages of workers in the bottom of the distribution are determined less by 
market forces and more by labour market institutions, like the minimum wage and other wage-setting 
arrangements – while the opposite is likely to be true for workers at the top of the wage distribution.  
Table 5: Proportion (%) of the difference in wage inequality with the United States explained by 
demand and supply conditions 
 
P90/P10 P90/P50 P50/P10 Gini 
Australia 23.0 23.2 18.8 13.9 
Austria 30.6 28.0 29.0 19.7 
Canada 21.1 9.6 -218.0 9.5 
Czech Republic 33.7 31.1 31.9 25.7 
Denmark 22.9 19.2 24.2 13.1 
England/N. Ireland (UK) 26.2 28.1 21.6 23.3 
Estonia 463.7 88.7 -102.4 87.1 
Finland 24.6 27.1 15.8 15.2 
Flanders (B) 24.4 25.2 17.1 14.7 
France 6.1 3.6 7.0 4.6 
Germany 82.1 29.0 -34.7 36.7 
Ireland 12.0 10.7 11.9 8.1 
Italy 13.5 12.9 12.1 9.6 
Japan 99.9 318.4 47.9 172.8 
Korea -34.1 -23.8 -54.0 -26.7 
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Netherlands 31.0 26.3 37.5 19.1 
Norway 20.6 19.2 16.8 12.1 
Poland 37.0 39.6 31.8 29.8 
Slovak Republic 68.1 68.3 65.3 84.7 
Spain 4.2 -7.1 16.2 0.0 
Sweden 20.1 22.3 11.9 11.9 
Notes: The table shows the proportion of the difference in wage inequality between the United States and country x that can be 
explained by differences in supply and demand conditions. For example, 23% of the difference in the P90-P10 wage ratios 
between the United States and Australia can be explained by differences in the demand for, and the supply of, skilled workers in 
Australia. Negative figures indicate that the difference between the United States and the comparator country would increase 
(rather than decrease) if the comparator country’s demand and supply conditions were adopted. 
In Table 6, we decompose the difference in wage inequality explained by market forces (and reported in 
Table 5) into the portions attributable to demand and supply, respectively. We do this following the same 
procedure as above, except that equation (4) is used to estimate two counterfactual wages: one using 
𝛽𝑆∆𝑆𝑆𝑥
𝑈𝑆 (holding demand constant); and the other using 𝛽𝐷∆𝐷𝑆𝑥
𝑈𝑆 (holding supply constant). The 
decomposition is not exact but shows that in most cases (and consistent with Table 4) it is differences in 
the supply of skills between the United States and the other countries that account for the differences in 
wage inequality. There are some interesting exceptions, however. In the cases of Ireland, Italy, Poland and 
Spain, for example, differences with the United States in the demand for skill play a more important role 
in explaining higher wage inequality. Canada, the Netherlands and Norway are also interesting examples, 
given that wage inequality in the United States would be even greater if it had the same demand for skills 
as in those countries.  
Table 6: Decomposition of the proportion (%) of the difference in wage inequality with the 
United States explained by demand and supply conditions 
 
P90/P10   P90/P50   P50/P10   Gini 
 
Demand Supply 
 
Demand Supply 
 
Demand Supply 
 
Demand Supply 
Australia 5.7 21.9 
 
5.6 19.9 
 
4.8 20.6 
 
2.6 11.6 
Austria 6.4 24.0 
 
7.5 20.3 
 
3.4 24.8 
 
4.6 15.8 
Canada -8.9 33.7 
 
-0.9 16.3 
 
153.8 -333.7 
 
-5.1 14.1 
Czech Republic 20.6 18.7 
 
19.8 12.7 
 
17.2 26.2 
 
14.0 13.7 
Denmark 0.7 22.3 
 
2.2 18.1 
 
-2.7 24.6 
 
0.2 12.9 
England/N. Ireland (UK) 10.3 15.7 
 
11.9 16.7 
 
7.6 12.9 
 
11.0 12.9 
Estonia 196.3 361.2 
 
45.1 54.3 
 
-31.0 -99.6 
 
34.4 55.7 
Finland 2.7 24.7 
 
4.1 25.9 
 
0.4 17.4 
 
1.4 14.7 
Flanders (B) 2.0 22.6 
 
1.1 21.9 
 
2.6 17.9 
 
1.2 13.7 
France 7.4 -1.5 
 
10.5 -6.4 
 
2.6 3.4 
 
4.7 -0.2 
Germany 31.7 64.1 
 
11.6 21.3 
 
-12.2 -29.1 
 
13.6 25.2 
Ireland 12.2 -2.0 
 
15.2 -10.1 
 
8.1 5.4 
 
10.0 -2.4 
Italy 34.5 -20.1 
 
40.1 -29.2 
 
23.3 -5.4 
 
22.8 -17.4 
Japan 21.6 89.8 
 
80.8 264.2 
 
6.6 48.1 
 
33.6 149.4 
Korea -35.8 -2.1 
 
-42.5 9.5 
 
-32.4 -18.2 
 
-26.7 2.0 
Netherlands -4.7 33.6 
 
-1.0 29.2 
 
-12.6 39.0 
 
-2.8 21.3 
Norway -1.6 21.2 
 
1.8 20.7 
 
-5.8 16.0 
 
-0.7 12.8 
Poland 34.4 9.7 
 
37.0 -0.9 
 
29.3 19.6 
 
27.1 2.3 
Slovak Republic 31.4 48.6 
 
24.0 38.3 
 
40.0 61.2 
 
28.1 61.8 
Spain 30.4 -23.7 
 
37.4 -33.1 
 
19.3 -9.4 
 
20.2 -24.1 
Sweden 1.3 19.8   2.8 21.3   -0.8 12.4   1.2 11.0 
19 
 
Notes: The table shows the proportion of the difference in wage inequality between the United States and country x that can be 
explained by differences in supply and demand conditions, respectively. For example, 5.7% of the difference in the P90-P10 wage 
ratios between the United States and Australia can be explained by differences in the demand for skills. Negative figures indicate 
that the difference between the United States and the comparator country would increase (rather than decrease) if the 
comparator country’s demand and supply conditions were adopted. 
6. The role of institutions 
When we decomposed higher wage inequality in the United States into a skill endowment and a skill price 
effect, we argued that the latter reflected a mixture of two factors: (i) different demand and supply 
conditions (which were analysed in the previous section); and (ii) differences in labour market institutions 
that affect the way skills are rewarded. In what follows, we apply the same wage simulation techniques 
used so far to analyse the role of minimum wages and union coverage in explaining higher wage inequality 
in the United States. The choice of institutions to be analysed was determined primarily by the fact that 
both of these have been found to have had a significant impact on wage inequality in the United States 
(see brief literature review in the introduction).  
Table 7 shows how the minimum-to-average wage ratio16 and the union coverage rate in the United States 
compare to those in the other countries included in our sample. While not all countries have a statutory 
minimum wage, at 27.2%, the United States has the lowest minimum-to-average wage ratio amongst the 
countries that do. Minimum wages are particularly high in Belgium, Ireland, Australia, the Netherlands 
and France, where they exceed 40% of the average wage. At 12.4%, the United States also has the 
second-lowest union coverage rate, compared to 56.6% on average across the countries included in the 
sample but close to 100% in some countries (Austria, Belgium, Sweden and France).  
Table 7: Minimum wages and union coverage rates 
 
Minimum-to-average wage (%) Union coverage rate (%) 
Australia 44.0 45.0 
Austria .. 99.0 
Canada 39.6 28.8 
Czech Republic 30.6 40.9 
Denmark .. 85.0 
England/N. Ireland (UK) 38.8 31.2 
Estonia 31.6 25.0 
Finland .. 89.5 
Flanders (B) 43.4 96.0 
France 49.8 92.0 
Germany .. 61.1 
Ireland 43.7 42.2 
Italy .. 85.0 
Japan 33.3 16.0 
Korea 34.5 10.0 
Netherlands 41.6 84.3 
Norway .. 74.0 
Poland 38.5 28.9 
Slovak Republic 35.8 35.0 
Spain 34.4 73.2 
Sweden .. 91.0 
United States 27.2 13.1 
Source: OECD (2015), "Earnings: Minimum wages relative to median wages", OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics 
(database). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00313-en. Minimum wages refer to 2012. Minimum wages refer to the adult 
national minimum wage or, in the absence of a national minimum wage, to the weighted average of regional minimum wages. In 
the case of the United States, average wages are obtained by the OECD from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment 
and Earnings, and refer to the average hourly earnings of production and non-supervisory workers. ICTWSS (Visser ,2013) for 
union coverage (latest year available). Current Population Survey (2011) for US union coverage rate.   
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In what follows, we estimate the extent to which higher wage inequality in the United States might be 
related to its lower minimum wage and union coverage rate. To do this, we simulate alternative wage 
distributions as before. In the case of minimum wages, the approach is relatively straightforward: we 
impose the minimum wage of the comparator country onto the United States wage distribution so that 
any worker earning less that the new minimum wage simply moves up to this new level. In doing so, we 
abstract away from: (i) non-coverage and non-compliance (both in the United States and in the 
comparator country17); (ii) possible spill-over effects on wages above the minimum; and (iii) dis-
employment effects from increasing the minimum wage.18  
PIAAC does not hold information on union coverage. To get round this problem, we proceed in three 
steps. First, we use external data sources to estimate the probability of each individual in the United States 
PIAAC data being covered by a union. Second, we assign union coverage status to those individuals with 
the highest predicted probabilities of being covered by a union, subject to a number of constraints. Third, 
we use this union coverage variable to reweight the United States data to simulate the degree of union 
coverage in the other PIAAC countries. This last step then allows us to estimate the contribution of 
union coverage to higher wage inequality in the United States.  
To be more precise, in step one, we use data from the 2011 Current Population Survey (CPS) to estimate 
the likelihood of union coverage. We do this using a linear probability model with gender, age, industry, 
occupation and working time regime (part-time/full-time) as explanatory variables. The coefficients 
obtained from this regression are subsequently used to predict the probability of union coverage for each 
individual in the United States PIAAC data.  
In step two, we rank all observations in the United States PIAAC data in descending order of (predicted) 
probability of union coverage,19 and assign union coverage status, starting from the observation with the 
highest union coverage probability. We continue to do so one observation at a time, until the quota for 
characteristic c is reached, after which no more observations with that characteristic are assigned union 
coverage, and so on until all characteristic quotas have been filled.20  
In step three, we use the union coverage variable thus derived to reweight the United States data until we 
obtain union coverage rates similar to those in each of the other PIAAC countries. This is achieved 
simply by multiplying the survey weights of each observation that has union coverage by the ratio of the 
union coverage rate in the comparator country to union coverage rate in the United States, 
𝑈𝐶𝑥
𝑈𝐶𝑈𝑆
 and the 
survey weights of all other observations by 
1−𝑈𝐶𝑥
1−𝑈𝐶𝑈𝑆
.  
For illustrative purposes,   
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Figure 6 shows what would happen to the wage distribution in the United States if the latter: (i) adopted 
the Dutch minimum-to-average wage ratio; and (ii) had similar union coverage rates as in the 
Netherlands. By construction, the minimum wage only affects the bottom of the wage distribution, while 
union coverage rates significantly alter the entire wage distribution, leading to an important fall in wage 
inequality in the United States.  
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Figure 6: The United States wage distribution before and after applying the Dutch minimum 
wage and union coverage rate 
A. US before and after Dutch minimum wage            B. US before and after Dutch union coverage 
 
Notes: Epanechnikov kernel density plots (evaluated at 50 points).  
The full results from the institutional simulations are presented in Table 8. The lower minimum wage in 
the United States accounts for 66.3% of the difference with France in bottom-half wage inequality. In 
many cases, however, the minimum wage in the United States cannot explain any of the difference in 
wage inequality with the other countries and, on average, it accounts for less than 7% of the cross-country 
differences in the Gini coefficient. By contrast, lower union coverage in the United States accounts for a 
significant share of the differences in wage inequality with other countries, particularly in the top half of 
the wage distribution. The overall contribution of differences in union coverage to differences in wage 
inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient) is 39.5%.  
Table 8: Proportion (%) of the difference in wage inequality with the United States explained by 
the minimum wage and union coverage 
 
Minimum wage 
 
Union coverage (CPS) 
 
P90/P10 P90/P50 P50/P10 Gini 
 
P90/P10 P90/P50 P50/P10 Gini 
Australia 22.6 0.0 44.7 11.4 
 
22.7 45.4 -10.2 23.8 
Austria .. .. .. .. 
 
54.9 75.0 15.8 67.5 
Canada 7.0 0.0 -136.1 7.3 
 
13.5 25.0 254.5 17.4 
Czech Republic 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
 
15.9 28.4 -15.5 18.7 
Denmark .. .. .. .. 
 
36.5 46.7 3.2 37.3 
England/N. Ireland (UK) 1.1 0.0 2.0 7.7 
 
16.7 39.6 -7.2 26.4 
Estonia 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 
 
101.1 52.9 27.5 37.9 
Finland .. .. .. .. 
 
38.5 57.7 6.2 39.5 
Flanders (B) 14.4 0.0 29.6 7.0 
 
43.9 59.1 11.9 44.7 
France 39.7 0.3 66.3 17.9 
 
42.9 68.0 9.7 47.1 
Germany .. .. .. .. 
 
80.7 60.4 30.4 64.7 
Ireland 28.0 0.0 49.3 18.0 
 
24.7 66.8 -17.5 36.1 
Italy .. .. .. .. 
 
58.5 95.7 3.8 70.3 
Japan 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 
 
8.4 23.9 4.4 11.9 
Korea 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.8 
 
4.5 3.6 6.3 4.0 
Netherlands 9.1 0.0 29.7 7.7 
 
51.7 65.2 5.4 57.2 
Norway .. .. .. .. 
 
28.8 43.2 -0.7 30.6 
Poland 0.4 0.0 0.7 9.2 
 
12.8 45.7 -24.0 29.8 
Slovak Republic 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.2 
 
34.7 66.4 -17.2 65.7 
Spain 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 
 
54.4 100.5 -6.2 66.6 
Sweden .. .. .. ..   36.7 52.0 9.6 33.2 
Notes: The table shows the proportion of the difference in wage inequality between the United States and country x that can be 
explained by minimum wages and union coverage rates, respectively. For example, 22.7% of the difference in the P90-P10 wage 
ratios between the United States and Australia can be explained by a different union coverage rate in Australia. Negative figures 
indicate that the difference between the United States and the comparator country would increase (rather than decrease) if the 
comparator country’s minimum wage or union coverage rate were adopted 
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7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have revisited the role that skills play in explaining higher wage inequality in the United 
States. Contrary to most previous research, we find that skills do matter to wage inequality – both their 
supply (in relation to demand) as well as the way they are distributed. Any policy package aimed at 
reducing wage inequality in the United States would therefore only be comprehensive if it contained 
measures aimed at addressing both the low level of skills in the United States, as well as the high degree of 
inequality in the way that these skills are distributed. In addition, the paper has shown that labour market 
institutions also matter. Higher wage inequality in the United States can be blamed in part on the 
relatively low level of the minimum wage, although the contribution of the latter is relatively modest. In 
comparison, the low rate of union coverage in the United States appears to play a far more important in 
explaining higher wage inequality compared to other OECD countries.  
As closing remarks, two important points deserve to be raised. The first of these is that, while the present 
paper has separately estimated the importance of labour market institutions and skills on wage inequality, 
the two are, of course, highly dependent on one another. On the one hand, institutions can determine the 
demand for skills: for example, if minimum wages (including bargained wages) and non-wage costs are 
high, employers are likely to offshore part of their activity where this is possible or, alternatively, invest in 
labour-saving technologies. Similarly, if high income taxes reduce the wage premium to be gained from 
investing in skills, then individuals may be deterred from making human capital investments (or move 
abroad in pursuit of higher returns). Vice versa, if the demand for skills is high, then this will stimulate 
investment in skills (or attract workers from abroad). The second point to be made is that institutions are, 
of course, highly endogenous: societies that are more homogenous are likely to choose institutions that 
reflect this – which may, in turn, have an impact on the relative supply of skills groups. This 
interdependence and endogeneity imply that it may not be possible to change just one institution and 
obtain the desired effect on wage inequality. Alternatively, it could mean that policy interventions have 
multiplier effects beyond the results hoped for. These are important points to bear in mind for policy 
makers concerned with reducing inequality.  
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Annex 
Figure A.1: Returns to skills in the United States 
 Notes: The “average per skill interval” shows the average wage in each skill interval S (of 5 skill points each), as 
described above. The “cubic spline” shows the fitted values of a cubic spline fit (with three knots).
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1 These figures are taken from the OECD Earnings Database. Data for the United States are from the Current 
Population Survey and reflect gross usual weekly earnings of full-time workers aged 16 and over.  
2 At around the same time, Devroye and Freeman (2001) also use the IALS, but a different type of decomposition 
method, to reach essentially the same conclusions as Blau and Kahn (2005).  
3 Paccagnella (2015) and Pena (2015) use the same data as us, however Pena (2015) does not have access to 
continuous wage data for five of the countries, including the United States. Paccagnella (2015) does not face this 
limitation.  
4 While Pena (2015) simply uses the Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) decomposition, Paccagnella (2015) turns to 
unconditional quantile regressions in the spirit of Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009). As argued later in this paper, we 
believe that our choice of methodology is better suited for analysing the relationship between skills and wage 
inequality and, in particular, to extend the analysis to incorporate market forces as well as institutions. Another, 
more specific, limitation of the approach taken by Paccagnella (2015) is that his application of the unconditional 
quantile regression method only allows for an analysis of the effect of overall, average skill levels (and not the entire 
skills distribution) on wage inequality. 
5 Both Paccagnella (2015) and Pena (2015) fail to account for the demand for skills (shown to be important by 
Leuven, Oosterbeek and van Ophem, 2004), and neither paper models the impact of institutions. Instead, and in 
line with much of the previous research in this field, both authors simply assume that the price effect can be 
attributed to differences in labour market institutions, without testing that assumption.  
6 In a companion paper (Broecke, Quintini and Vandeweyer, 2015) we use the PIAAC data and replicate more 
closely the previous debate on skills and wage inequality, including the Katz and Murphy (1992) demand and supply 
model. The findings of that paper confirm Leuven, Oosterbeek and van Ophem’s (2004) finding that demand and 
supply is likely to an important determinant of wage inequality. However, because demand and supply are analysed 
using a different methodology to that used for analysing the importance of skills levels, it is difficult to make an 
assessment of the relative importance of these two factors. In addition, while other papers have argued that labour 
market institutions play an important role in explaining international differences in wage inequality, their results are 
also difficult to compare to the role played by skills. Coming up with a method for comparing the relative 
importance of all these factors was the primary motivation for the present paper and is what, in our eyes, sets it 
apart from the other literature on the topic.  
7 The correlation between years of education and numeracy is approximately 0.5 across the 22 countries included in 
this paper.  
8 A second round of the survey is being carried out from 2012 to 2016 in Chile, Greece, Indonesia, Israel, Lithuania, 
New Zealand, Singapore, Slovenia and Turkey.  
9 Throughout the paper, numeracy is used as the skill variable of choice, however virtually identical results are 
obtained when using literacy instead.  
10 Differences in the distribution of skills across countries may be driven by differences in socio-demographic 
characteristics. Even when controlling for gender, number of children, age, age squared, and whether individuals are 
foreign-born or not, the United States still has the highest level of skills inequality of the 22 countries analysed in 
this paper.  
11 Unconditional quantile regressions have become a popular decomposition method. However, as argued by Fortin, 
Lemieux and Firpo (2011), the approximations applied by this method can be problematic in the presence of 
minimum wages (i.e. unsmooth wage distributions). This is another reason why we prefer to use the reweighting 
method in the present paper.  
12 Bigger intervals are created at the top and bottom of the skill distribution to guarantee a sufficient number of 
observations.  
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13
 Note that this would not happen in the top half of the wage distribution, since the wages of those at the P50 and 
the P90 would increase at about the same rate.  
14 The size of the skill intervals is set at 10, rather than at 5 as in the previous analyses, to guarantee a sufficient 
number of observations per skill-industry group.  
15 We use the same occupation-industry classification as Blau & Kahn (1996) and Leuven et al. (2004), i.e. three 
occupation groups (managers and professionals; clerical and sales workers; craft workers, operatives, laborers and 
service workers) and six industry groups (agriculture; mining, manufacturing and construction; transportation, 
communication and public utilities; trade; finance, insurance, real estate and services; government).
 
16 The minimum-to-average wage ratio was chosen instead of the minimum-to-median purely for modelling reasons. 
Indeed, the United States has the lowest minimum-to-average wage ratio of the countries included in the sample, 
but the same is not true of the minimum-to-median. Given that it would be much more difficult (and less 
interesting) to simulate what would happen if the minimum wage decreased in the United States, the minimum-to-
average wage ratio is a more obvious choice than the minimum-to-median.  
17
 The degree of non-coverage and non-compliance is low, with on average 2.8% of wage-earners across the sample 
reporting a wage below the minimum wage (ranging from 0% in the United States to 9.2% in Korea). Our results 
will nevertheless reflect both: (i) the effect of increasing the minimum wage; and (ii) the effect of moving to full 
compliance/coverage. To see what difference non-compliance and non-coverage make to our results, we re-ran the 
models after first assuming full compliance/coverage in each country (i.e. the wage of every individual reporting a 
wage below the national minimum wage was replaced with the national minimum wage). The effect of increasing the 
minimum wage was then calculated in comparison to this “full compliance and coverage” baseline scenario. While 
there is no impact on inequality measuring interdecile wage ratios, the average contribution of the minimum wage to 
explaining differences in the Gini coefficient drops from 6.9% to 6.5%.  
18 As a robustness check, we tested how sensitive our results are to the assumption of no dis-employment effects. 
To do this, we first calculate the distance d (in percentage terms) between individual i’s wage and the new imposed 
minimum wage. The probability p of becoming unemployed for that individual is then computed as p = e*d, where e 
is the elasticity of employment with respect to the minimum wage. The total employment loss u is then estimated as 
u = ∑𝑝 ∗
𝑖
∑𝑖
, where i is the weight attached to observation i and 
𝑖
∑𝑖
 therefore represents the share of observation 
i in the sample. With an employment elasticitity of e=0.2, we find that employment losses are small (0.2% on 
average) and are therefore unlikely to affect our wage inequality results significantly. Indeed, assuming that 
employment losses are concentrated amongst those workers with the lowest wages, the contribution of the 
minimum wage to explaining higher wage inequality in the United States (as measured by the Gini index) falls from 
6.9% to 6.8%.   
19 Observations with the same union coverage probability are ranked in descending order of age. Observations with 
the same union coverage probability and age are further ranked in descending order of firm size. 
20 Using this procedure, we obtain an average union coverage rate of 12.4% in the United States, close to the actual 
union coverage rate of 13.1%. We also find that workers covered by unions are primarily concentrated at the top of 
the wage distribution. Further analysis suggests that this is driven by the wage premium attached to being covered by 
a union. When we simulate non-union wages for workers covered by unions, we find that union workers shift 
towards the upper-middle end of the new (simulated) wage distribution. This finding is consistent with earlier 
findings from Card (2001) and Card, Lemieux and Riddell (2004), who showed that union membership among 
males was concentrated in the (upper)-middle of the wage distribution, and female union membership rates in the 
(upper-)middle and top. Mayer (2004) also found that union membership is highest among workers with advanced 
college degrees. 
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